This paper investigates why Korean companies go public, and their subsequent performance. Current industry market-to-book increases IPO probability, while lagged-MTB decreases it. Ex ante and ex post evidence suggests firms do not go public to fund investment in fixed assets. Financially marginal firms are more likely to go public to take advantage of windows of opportunity. Financially healthier independents also go public to rebalance their portfolios. Chaebol subsidiaries apparently use IPOs to fund equity investments and take advantage of windows of opportunity. Buy-and-hold returns show IPOs outperformed the stock market--with the divergence widening over time--in contrast to developed markets.
Introduction.
Emerging stock markets play an increasingly important role in developing countries, but have received less attention than other financial sectors, while most studies of emerging stock markets have focused on the secondary market. 1 This paper examines why Korean companies go public, using ex ante and ex post evidence. We test the hypothesis of Singh (1995) that emerging market firms go public to finance investment alongside the conclusion of Pagano et al (1998) that Italian firms go public to rebalance accounts after a period of high investment and growth.
We find that current industry market-to-book increases IPO probability, while lagged-MTB decreases it. Financially marginal firms are more likely to go public to take advantage of windows of opportunity. Financially healthier independents also go public to rebalance their portfolios. It is difficult to infer the IPO motivations of Chaebol subsidiaries, but our evidence suggests that these firms use IPOs to fund equity investments and take advantage of windows of opportunity. We conclude that firms do not go public to fund new investment in fixed assets.
In addition, we find that Korean IPOs significantly outperform the stock market average.
Indeed, this divergence widens over time, in contrast to the IPO "new issue puzzle" literature on developed stock markets. Although consistent with our finding that IPOs exceed the market's average profitability in the five years after listing, the result still presents another IPO puzzle.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section I provides a brief literature review.
Section II describes the unique data sources and samples for the study. Section III analyzes the determinants of the decision to go public on the basis of firms' ex ante characteristics. Section IV reports the effects of going public on subsequent profitability, investment, cost of financing, and other accounting variables. Section V compares the stock market return on investments in IPOs with the market index. Section VI concludes.
I. Literature Review
In a recent paper in this Journal, Pagano et al. (1998) summarized theories of costs and benefits of the decision to go public; the following six observations are largely drawn from their review. First, smaller and newer companies are less well-known to investors; this informational asymmetry adversely affects the average quality of companies seeking to go public and thus their potential share price. As a result, IPO probability would be positively correlated with firm size.
Second, going public entails initial (IPO) and subsequent (listing) costs of underwriting, registration, legal, accounting, auditing, and other professional fees. In the United States in 1977 -1982 Ritter (1987 reported direct IPO costs of approximately $250,000, plus variable costs of some 7% of gross proceeds. In Italy, Pagano et al. (1998) report similar fixed costs and variable costs of about 3.5% of gross proceeds. In Korea, the variable cost has been reported to be about 3% of gross proceeds. 2 Liquidity of a company's shares increases with trading volume, so only sufficiently large companies may effectively gain the liquidity benefits. Thus, listing expenses do not increase proportionally with IPO size; again, the implication is that IPO probability will be positively correlated with company size.
Third, gaining access to a non-bank source of finance is a benefit of going public, especially to firms with major investment plans and high leverage. In this view, newly listed companies would increase investment or reduce debt after an IPO. Fourth, relatedly, by gaining stock market access and in the process disseminating information to investors, firms encourage competition for outside financing and generally receive a lower cost or a larger amount of credit (Rajan, 1992) . Thus, companies facing higher interest rates are more likely to go public, and interest rates paid by firms would be likely to fall after an IPO. Fifth, if diversification is an important motive in the IPO decision, then riskier companies would be more likely to go public.
Thus, IPO incidence may vary by industry.
Sixth, firms 'recognizing' that listed companies in their industry are overvalued have an incentive to go public (Ritter, 1984) . On the other hand, a high market-to-book (MTB) ratio may also indicate that investors anticipate valuable growth opportunities in an industry. If these opportunities require large investments, then companies will be induced to go public to raise funding (Singh, 1995) . If firms have higher growth and profits after an IPO, the latter interpretation is more likely; if lower, the former implication, known as the window of opportunity hypothesis, is more likely (Pagano et al.) . Singh and Hamid (1992) investigated the potential links between corporate capital structures and the types of financial markets and institutions that are supportive of long-term growth. To that end, they examined accounting and stock market information for the top fifty listed manufacturing corporations in nine LDCs -India, Korea, Jordan, Pakistan, Thailand, Mexico, Malaysia, and Turkey. They found that LDC corporations rely on external finance, particularly equity, for the growth of their net assets, to a greater extent than their counterparts in advanced economies. They concluded that more than 40% of corporate growth in five of their nine sample countries, including Korea, was financed by new share issues. Singh (1995) tested the robustness of these results by expanding his sample to the top hundred firms and by adding a tenth country, Brazil. Relying in part on UNCTAD (1993) statistics, Singh concluded that LDC corporations tap equity markets to finance investment.
In contrast, Pagano et al. (1998) Ritter concluded that these patterns were consistent with investors being "periodically overoptimistic about the earnings potential of young growth companies," which take advantage of these "windows of opportunity." Loughran and Ritter (1995) further examined the "new issue puzzle," concluding that U.S. IPOs have been poor long-run investments for investors over the 1970 to 1990 period. IPO underperformance is not restricted to the United States; for example, Levis (1993) showed that IPOs in the UK underperformed relevant benchmarks for 36 months after their first day of trading. In contrast, Kiymaz (1999) reports that Turkish IPOs substantially outperform the market in the three years following the first day of trading. Lee (1993) reported IPO outperformance for Korea based on three-year wealth relatives for firms going public from 1988 to 1990. We examine this claim with a larger number of firms and a longer time period.
II. The Korean case, and data sources and samples
The Korean stock market has greatly expanded over the last two decades. During the sample period from 1986 to 1995, the number of listed companies more than doubled from 355 to 721 (Table I ). The Korean stock market composite index rose nearly seven-fold from 138 at the end of 1985 to 934 at the end of 1996. In 1995, the market capitalization of these equities was equivalent to 40% of Korean GDP. 4 However, as shown in Table II , Korean firms have had a high debt ratio compared with the US, implying a heavy reliance on debt finance. Thus, Korean firms may have gone public to strengthen their balance sheets after a period of growth rather than to fund new investments, as Pagano et al. (1998) concluded for the case of Italian firms.
A. Data.
In Korea, as in most countries, private firms' financial information is not easily accessible. However, the presence of a government "corporate registration system" for private firms enables us to develop unique ex ante data for firms that go public and for others that, while qualified to go public, chose not to do so. While the eligible list is not public, the selection criteria are in the public domain. For the analysis of ex ante determinants, only companies legally eligible to go public in a given year are included. This parallels the methodology of Pagano et al (1998) . Thus, our full sample, termed Sample A, is restricted to (non-financial) companies that satisfied the listing requirements operative in a given year.
6
The Korean government imposed 15 IPO requirements at different times during the sample period. These consisted of factors both quantifiable (e.g. financial ratios) and non-quantifiable (e.g. audit opinions). The requirements were modified several times during the study period (see Table III Among the 82 IPOs removed in the process of generating sample A-1, 64 (21%) were removed due to high leverage while the remaining 18 (6%) were removed due to low sales. Table IV .C reports summary statistics of Sample A-1 and A-2, respectively. Among other differences, firms in Sample A-1 are more profitable, and have lower interest costs, than those in Sample A-2. Firms in sample A-1 that went public form our sample B-1.
C. Variables.
The logarithm of total firm assets (ASSET) is used as a measure of corporate size. 9 The growth rate of fixed assets (INVEST) is used to measure firms' requirements for direct investment funds (e.g. in plant and equipment), while GROWTH is the rate of growth of total assets. The median ratio of the yearly average market-to-book value of equity of public companies in the same industry (MTB) was used as a proxy for future investment opportunities, or to measure the buoyancy of the relevant market. LEVERAGE is measured as the value of total debt over total debt plus equity. Return on assets (ROA) is used as a proxy for profitability.
Another ratio used was operating income to interest expense (COVERAGE). Unfortunately, in Korea, bank credit information for individual companies is not available. Thus, INTEREST is measured by total interest expense divided by total debt as a proxy of the actual interest rate for the company. In table IV, we present sample statistics for each of these variables, for the whole sample, and for each of the subsamples examined.
III. Analysis of Ex Ante Determinants
In this section, a probit model is used to estimate the probability of going public. The model used is:
Pr(IPO it =1) = F(a 1 ASSETS t-1 + a 2 GROWTH t-1 + a 3 LEVERAGE it-1 + a 4 ROA it-1 + a 5 MTB it + a 6 MTB it-1 + a 7 COVERAGE it-1 + a 8 INVEST it-1 + a 9 INTEREST it-1 + µ t + V t )
The dependent variable takes the value 0 if company i stays private in period t and 1 if it goes public; F(·) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal variable. Two vectors of dummy variables µ t account for time and industry effects.
A. Specification.
Using the sample selection process described in section II, 2,026 firm observations meeting the official IPO listing requirements during the sample period (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) were selected for analysis. As shown in Table V positive effect on IPO probability. However, we also found that lagged MTB significantly and robustly decreases the probability of listing (we interpret this finding further below).
In arriving at the final specification in Table VI , and in examining further the opposite signs of the coefficients on current and lagged MTB, we ran alternative regressions with different combinations of MTB and dummy variables. Table VII with time dummies only. For all specifications, the coefficient on current MTB is consistently positive and that on lagged MTB is consistently negative; and both are individually statistically significant. When both current and lagged MTB are entered together in the regression, each is generally significant. There is one exception to this result: when including industry dummies, the coefficient on current MTB in the Chaebol subsample is statistically insignificant (we interpret this exception below). The results of the likelihood ratio tests reveal that industry dummies are significant as a group for all specifications as well as for all the sample groups as shown at the bottom of Table VI . Time dummies are also jointly significant. Thus, the selected specification includes both time and industry dummies, and both current and lagged MTB.
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The regression results provide evidence to support the interpretation that the information content of lagged MTB is different than that of current MTB. Thus, regressions with only one of the two statistically significant MTB variables would appear to have omitted variable bias. In future research it would be valuable to determine whether this finding may apply to data sets from other countries. As regression results including both MTB variables were selected in the specification, these results, given in Table VI , will be used in the discussion that follows.
B. Results for the Full Sample.
The first column of Table VI reports results for the whole sample, while the second and third columns report results for Chaebol subsidiaries and independent companies, respectively.
MTB is the most significant determinant of IPOs. For the whole sample, current MTB increases the probability of launching an IPO and lagged MTB decreases it. MTB is both a proxy for Thus, for the full sample and for independent companies, coefficients of both current and lagged MTB are always statistically significant. Again, in the only exception, for Chaebol subsidiaries the coefficient on current MTB is positive but not statistically significant. We may tentatively conclude that the window of opportunity motive is stronger for independent firms than for the chaebol subsidiaries; we consider this interpretation further below.
The opposite signs on current and lagged IPO may seem paradoxical at first but we believe that there is a straightforward explanation. Most firms wishing to conduct an IPO would already have done so when MTB has recently been high; these effects would be partly captured by the sign on lagged MTB. Only a relatively small group of firms whose propensity to go public has markedly increased, or which has suddenly met the minimum government criteria for going public, would be expected to conduct an IPO in the period immediately following a high MTB ratio. In other words, the stock of firms with the eligibility and propensity to go public becomes temporarily depleted when MTB has been high, so that lagged MTB has a negative effect on current IPOs. Similarly, firms may postpone an IPO when MTB is low.
In Korea, during 1988 Korea, during -1989 , there was a clustering of IPOs, which continued to some extent into 1990. As shown in Table VI , rows 13, 14, and 15, the coefficients of these three year dummies are generally statistically significant, particularly so for 1989; time effects are jointly significant. Three industries, basic metal products, machinery and equipment, and electric power, water and gas supply, are individually significant in the full sample; and the industry effects are jointly significant.
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Other than MTB and time effects, assets, our proxy for firm size, is the most important determinant of the probability of listing. 13 As presented earlier, there are several theories supporting the positive impact of firm size on the probability of an IPO. Listing on an exchange provides liquidity and diversification benefits to the initial owners of a firm. The liquidity benefits of listing only accrue above a critical level of trading volume and capitalization. Further, the informational asymmetry between investors and issuers about the true value of companies going public causes adverse selection costs, which is more serious for small companies. Listing also carries considerable expenses. Other things equal, only firms above a certain threshold can recover these expenses.
As shown in the ninth row of Table VI (INVEST) , the growth rate of fixed assets has a negative coefficient, statistically significant at the 10% level for the Chaebol subsample; the effect is negative but insignificant for the independent companies. This is in contrast to Singh's (1995) study, which concluded that the largest Korean firms raise investment funds largely through the stock market. In addition, the coefficients of current MTB are statistically significant only for independent companies, suggesting these firms may have been more likely to go public to take advantage of windows of opportunity.
The growth rate of total assets is an alternative variable measuring a firm's financing needs, but in much broader terms including acquisitions, channeling funds to subsidiaries, and other equity investments. This variable (GROWTH) is negatively associated with the likelihood of an IPO for the independent firms, and positively for the Chaebol subsidiaries; but the coefficients, like that of the remaining variables, are not statistically significant.
C. Results for Financially Healthier and More Marginal Firms.
We also ran separate probits for the financially healthier and more marginal firms (samples A1 and A2) as described above. Results are reported in Table VIII. 14 The two samples are statistically different. As with the full sample, for all specifications, current MTB and lagged MTB show opposite signs. However, for the healthier firms (A-1), current MTB is not significant, while it is significant for the more marginal firms (A-2). We interpret this finding as an indication that the IPO decisions of the marginal firms are more driven by the presence of windows of opportunity.
For sample A-1, in addition to lagged MTB, significant determinants of the probability of listing are size, profitability, coverage, investment, and the growth rate of assets. For sample A-2, size, leverage, and investment are significant. Thus, the probability of listing increases in firm size and fixed investments in both subsamples.
The growth rate of total assets (GROWTH) increases the probability of listing in sample A-1 and this effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. Presumably, faster growing companies are in need of funds for working capital and/or investment and more likely to conduct
IPOs to finance their growth. However, there is no significant effect for the more marginal firms.
At the same time, the growth rates of fixed assets (INVEST) decreases the probability of listing and is statistically significant at the 5% level for both healthy and marginal firms.
For sample A-1 only, the probability of an IPO is increasing in coverage (operating income divided by interest cost), and this effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. This implies that among higher quality firms, those with less debt, and perhaps faster growth, are more likely to go public. In contrast to the results on coverage, the probability of an IPO is decreasing in ROA.
D. Concluding remarks.
Broadly, from the ex ante evidence it appears that financially less healthy firms, perhaps especially independents, may go public to take advantage of windows of opportunity. Healthier independent firms may also go public to rebalance their portfolios; probability of investment is increasing in asset growth for independent firms. At the same time, probability of investment is decreasing in investment for the subsample of financially marginal firms.
Motivations for the Chaebol subsidiaries, especially financially healthier ones, to go public are less easy to infer from the ex ante evidence. However, although not statistically significant, there is a positive coefficient on the growth of total assets; a positive coefficient is also found for financially healthier firms, while a negative coefficient is found for the financially marginal firms. Taken together the results suggests that, to the extent that firms go public to fund expansion retroactively or rebalance their portfolios, the expansion thus funded is mainly associated with takeovers, investment in subsidiaries, or other equity investments, rather than through direct investment in new fixed assets (property, equipment and plant).
Indeed, historically, many Korean firms have expanded or diversified their businesses through long run equity investment in an effort to gain management control of other firms.
Companies also provided and or arranged for financing, and provided guarantees, for affiliates'
and subsidiaries' debt. These activities may have increased the need for outside sources of finance, or at least increased the propensity to go public.
IV. Analysis of Ex Post Performance
For the analysis of ex post performance the model specification is given by, 4 Y it = a + Σ B j IPO t-j + B 5 IPO t-n + u i + d t + e it (2) J=1
In (2), Y it is the i th accounting variable in the t th period, which represent firm operating performance. IPO t-j is a dummy variable equal to one if year t-j is the IPO year, while IPO t-n is a dummy variable equal to one if the IPO took place five or more years ago. Firm specific effects, u i , and time-specific effects, d t , are included.
For this analysis, data from 325 non-financial firms that went public during the sampling period (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) are used to estimate the impact of an IPO on ex post performance.
15
However, the observation for the year in which firms went public is eliminated to avoid the "timing problem," the same as for the analysis of ex ante determinants. The sample statistics for the full sample firms are presented in Table IX .
As shown in the first section of Table IX (ROA), profitability declines for the full sample after an IPO. This effect is gradual but steady, deteriorating from -2.6 % in the first year after the IPO to -4.2% in the fifth year following the IPO. The fall in profitability is statistically significant at the 1% level in each individual year. The magnitude of this effect is stronger for
Chaebol subsidiaries than independent companies, as confirmed by an F-test, which rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficient vectors are the same for the two groups. The fall in profitability after an IPO is consistent with the findings of Jain and Kini (1994) , Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah(1997) , and Pagano et al. (1998) . As Jain and Kini (1994) and Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) point out, there are several possible explanations for declines in post-IPO operating performance, including increased agency costs, managers' window-dressing of accounting numbers prior to going public, and the timing of IPOs to coincide with unusually high profitability.
For the full sample, the decision to go public has a negative impact on the investment growth rate, as shown in the seventh section of the table (INVEST). This finding is in contrast to the conclusions of Singh (1995) . For the full sample, investment growth rates decline sharply in the first year after an IPO, statistically significant at the 5% level. However, this effect is not significant statistically for independent companies. For Chaebol subsidiaries, the effect is very strong, with the deterioration ranging from -7.45 % for the first year after an IPO to -18.57% for the fifth and later years after an IPO, statistically significant at the 5% level for all years. After listing, the growth rate of total assets (the sixth section of the Table: GROWTH) decreases for all years; this effect is only significant for independent companies. LEVERAGE (third section) sharply decreases in the first year (6.4% for the full sample)
following an IPO. This effect is larger and longer for independent companies, and is statistically significant at the 1% level for 2 years after an IPO. For Chaebol subsidiaries, this effect is statistically significant at the 1% level only for the first year after an IPO. A sharp decline in leverage and in investment after an IPO supports the hypothesis that firms substituted their source of funds from debt to equity in order to deleverage. This is more the case for independent companies than Chaebol subsidiaries. However, this deleveraging effect is not long lasting.
Leverage actually increases from 5 years after an IPO, statistically significant at the 1% level for the full sample. Pagano et al. (1998) point out that the cost of credit may fall after an IPO because of three factors: companies become safer borrowers when they reduce their leverage; more information becomes publicly available so lenders have more information about creditworthiness; and being listed on the stock market offers a company an outside financing option that improves firm bargaining power with banks (as in Rajan, 1992) . Moreover, a successful IPO might help to build the firm's credibility more generally. As shown in the fifth section of Table XI (INTEREST) , for the full sample, an IPO is followed by decreases in the cost of debt, but this effect is not statistically significant except for the fourth year after the IPO. For
Chaebol subsidiaries, the cost of debt falls after an IPO. This drop is statistically significant for the first two years after an IPO, and again in the fifth year after an IPO and thereafter, when the cost of debt decreases even more (2.4%, statistically significant at the 5% level). For independent companies, an IPO decreases the cost of debt for all years after an IPO, but this effect is not statistically significant except the fourth year after IPO. Despite these apparent differences, for INTEREST, the F-test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient vectors are the same across Chaebol subsidiaries and independent companies.
Again, comparing results for financially healthier and more marginal firms assists in the interpretation of the reasons for going public. As seen in Table X , several notable differences are found between the two samples. Profitability falls for both sets of firms, but interestingly the effect is statistically and quantitatively larger for the healthier firms. On the other hand, leverage falls more in the ex ante healthier firms, and substantially rises for the more marginal firms five years and more after the IPO. The fall in growth of total assets is larger and more significant for the healthier firms. Finally, for the healthier firms, investment in fixed assets such as plant and equipment is unaffected by the IPO, but it falls substantially (and statistically significantly) for the first four years following an IPO for the marginal firms.
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In sum, we can reject the hypothesis that firms go public to fund future increases in fixed investments, such as plant and equipment. While difficult to interpret individually, taken together with the other findings the ex post evidence suggests that independent firms, especially financially less healthy ones, appear to go public to take advantage of windows of opportunity.
Motivations for chaebol subsidiaries are again more difficult to interpret; we return to this problem in the conclusions.
V. Stock Market Performance of Korean IPOs
In this section, we examine the stock market performance of Korean IPOs, using the Korea Securities Research Institute daily stock return database (KSRI-SD). 17 First, we calculate buy-and-hold returns for each IPO from the close of the first KSE-listed day to the first, third, and fifth anniversary date of the offering. The percentage buy-and-hold return for firm i (i= 1…n) is given by:
where s is the first listing date, and T is the end of the one-year, three-year, and five-year holding periods.
Second, the average equally weighted holding-period returns for IPOs issued in calendar year j, for the average 1-year, 3-year, and 5-year buy-and-hold return, (j=1,3,5) are calculated as:
where R isT is the percentage buy-and-hold return on firm i for holding period T.
The buy-and-hold returns from the KSE KOSPI index are calculated as benchmarks assuming that the KOSPI portfolios have the same trading period as the IPOs. The buy-and-hold return of the KOSPI is calculated by compounding the daily returns for the index from the starting day of the KOSPI to the same ending date of 1-year, 3-year and 5-year anniversary as the IPOs.
Finally, wealth relatives are defined as the ratio of the end-of-period wealth from holding a portfolio of IPOs to the end-of-period wealth from holding the KOSPI portfolio. Wealth relatives are ratios of average gross returns, given by
where R it is the holding-period return on firm i for holding period t, R mt is the holding-period returns on KOSPI over the same holding period (with the same starting date) as firm i for holding period t, and the summations are over the N observations in a cohort year. For example, the 1988 one-year wealth relative of 0.95 is computed as 1.633/1.727, with 1,633 being the terminal wealth per Korean won invested after having gained 63.3 percent on the IPO portfolio.
Focusing on the five-year return, shown in the last row of The systematically superior stock market performance of IPOs is a puzzle. In an emerging market, it is natural to wonder whether government intervention or regulation might be a cause. The Korean government regulated the IPO market through listing requirements (as discussed in section II), and also intervened on the initial pricing of IPOs and its stock price thereafter. This intervention has changed over time from a promotional policy to a restrictive policy, depending on the strategy of the government. From 1968 to 1982, the government promoted IPOs to expand the capital market by providing tax benefits for IPOs. Then, the government began a period of deregulation of the IPO market beginning in 1983; and the period from 1988 to 1990 was a highly deregulated market for IPOs. IPOs were probably clustered in this period because of deregulation as well as the rapid economic expansion in Korea. However, a slowdown of the economy and probably an oversupply of new issues caused a decline in the stock market, and a return to government regulation followed. In 1990, the government began a policy of intervention in IPO pricing, in which a penalty was imposed on agents or underwriters if the IPO price was overvalued compared to the firm's actual earnings or if the stock price fell below the IPO price within 3 months of an IPO. Thus, government intervention could have been a cause of initial IPO underpricing; and there was an incentive for further manipulation for the first three months after listing. However, Lee (1993) examined firms that went public during the 1988 to 1990 deregulated period and concluded that IPOs were underpriced even without government regulation. In any case, government intervention cannot explain our finding of increasingly superior performance of IPO from one to three, and then from three to five years after issue.
Note that the outperformance of IPOs in the stock market is consistent with the ex post financial performance of the IPO. As shown in the ex post analysis in section IV, financial performance of IPOs was deteriorating over time. However, IPOs' average ROA for 10 years from 1986 to 1995 was 0.083 (Table XI) , substantially higher than the market average of 0.049.
Moreover, the average debt ratio of IPOs for same period of time was 200%, well below the market average of 303%. Thus, even though IPOs' profitability was deteriorating over time,
IPOs remained relatively more profitable than the market average.
Taken together, government intervention and higher profitability may offer important clues to the systematically superior stock market performance of IPOs in Korea, but they do not fully explain why this gap in market returns persisted even well after three years had passed.
VI. Conclusions
In this study, alternative explanations of why emerging market companies go public were examined with the use of a unique data set from Korea. Pagano et al. (1998) found the determinants of listing for Italian companies by examining ex ante characteristics and ex post financial performance of IPOs. Similar measures and methodologies were used in this study to explore the determinants of listing for Korean firms.
However, this study differs from Pagano et al. (1998) in several respects. First, the "timing problem," in which year-end accounting variables partly reflect the effects of the IPO rather than exclusively its ex ante determinants was addressed in both the analysis of ex ante characteristics and the analysis of ex post performance. Second, lagged MTB was used in addition to the current MTB as a regressor in the analysis of ex ante characteristics, and each was found to have opposite and jointly statistically significant effects. Third, industry effects were taken into account in the determinants of IPOs. Fourth, in part because Korean firms historically have had a high debt ratio compared to that of other countries and are chronically short of funds to support their rapid growth, firms not meeting official requirements may have manipulated their financial statements to become eligible for an IPO. To explore this possibility, a subsample of financially healthier firms was created, and some significant differences were found.
In summary, for independent firms the current industry MTB ratio robustly increased the probability of an IPO, suggesting that these firms went public to take advantage of windows of opportunity. No significance for this variable was found for Chaebol subsidiaries. However, for all subsamples, the lagged MTB robustly decreased the probability of an IPO, possibly because most firms with a high propensity and eligibility to conduct an IPO have done so when there has been a recent hot market. In all subsamples, larger firms were more likely to go public. In the Chaebol subsidiary subsample, firms with higher rates of investment in fixed assets were less likely to go public. Healthier independent firms may also go public to rebalance their portfolios; the probability of going public is increasing in asset growth for the subsample of financially healthier independent firms. At the same time, for the subsample of financially more marginal firms, the probability of going public is decreasing in fixed investment (significantly) and asset growth (insignificantly).
One problem with interpreting the IPO motives for Chaebol subsidiaries is that funds raised may be fungible across affiliated firms, such as through the use of transfer pricing. This may skew both ex ante and ex post results for this subsample. However, the evidence is at least suggestive that Chaebol subsidiaries use IPOs to fund takeovers or other equity investments.
Growth of total assets has a positive, though statistically insignificant, effect on the probability of an IPO. While Chaebol subsidiaries decrease investments in fixed assets after an IPO, statistically, they do not decrease their rate of growth of total assets. Moreover, these firms increase their leverage ratios, five years and later following the IPO, to a larger degree than the independent firms; this effect is especially strong when omitting the financially marginal firms. It seems likely that some of the funds raised, both directly from equity and indirectly from additional debt, are finding their way to investments in or by affiliated firms. This is an important subject for future research.
After an IPO, all subsamples had lower profitability, experienced a modest fall in interest rates, and tended to have first falling, then rising leverage. The fact that profitability declined for
Chaebol subsidiaries at least as much as for independent firms indicates that the window of opportunity explanation cannot be ruled out for these Chaebol carveouts. Chaebol subsidiaries substantially reduced fixed investments after an IPO, with the effect growing over time; but no significant effect was found for the independent firms. Independent firms modestly but statistically significantly reduced their growth rate of total assets; while for Chaebol subsidiaries the effect was negative but not significant.
Thus, we conclude that Chaebol subsidiaries did not go public to fund fixed investments, but likely did use IPOs to finance company growth through such measures as equity investments in other firms. While not inconsistent with Singh's (1995) conclusion that large Korean firms went public to fund new investments, our study sheds important light on the meaning of that finding. In addition, Chaebol subsidiaries may also have gone public, as did the independent firms, to take advantage of windows of opportunity.
At the same time, we also found that financially healthier independent companies went public to deleverage after a period of rapid expansion of their businesses rather than to fund further investments or growth. This is consistent with Pagano et al.'s conclusion that Italian firms went public to rebalance their portfolios after a period of rapid growth.
As a whole, financially healthier firms and more marginal firms were found to have different motives for conducting an IPO. For the more marginal firms, the current market-tobook value was a significant determinant of the probability of an IPO, a result that was found to be most consistent with the window of opportunity hypothesis. The growth rate of fixed assets, a proxy for investment in equipment, property, and plant, was a significant negative determinant.
Moreover, after an IPO, marginal firms' profitability and fixed asset growth rates decreased significantly. Thus, the marginal firms tend to go public to take advantage of a "window of opportunity" rather than to fund their growth or rebalance their accounts after rapid growth.
Following an IPO, financially more marginal firms substantially decreased their investment in fixed assets, an effect statistically significant at the 1% level, but no effect was found for the financially healthier firms. While an initial decline in leverage was observed for all firms, the decrease was smaller for more marginal firms; moreover, only the marginal firms showed the later increase in leverage, statistically significant at the 5% level, five and more years following the IPO. Interestingly, the financially more marginal firms exhibited a smaller decrease in profitability than the healthier firms.
To summarize, ex ante and ex post evidence suggest that firms do not go public to fund investment in fixed assets. Independent firms, especially financially marginal ones, go public to take advantage of windows of opportunity. Healthier independents also go public to rebalance their portfolios. Chaebol subsidiaries apparently use IPOs to fund equity investments and to take advantage of windows of opportunity.
Finally, in Korea, IPOs outperform the stock market average in the long run. This finding is consistent with the superior ex post financial performance of IPOs; and government intervention also helps to partially explain these results. However, because the performance gap occurs well after the initial trading day, and even widens as performance is compared over one-, three-, and five-year intervals, the findings represent a new puzzle that will be important to address in future research. __________________________________________________________________________ 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1994 1995 1996 *A: previous year of IPO: over 20 billion average previous 3 years of IPO : over 15 billion *B: less than 150% of the average debt ratio of the firms in the same industry *C: (1)higher than the time deposit interest rate for 2 years prior to IPO or (2) higher than the time deposit interest rate for the previous year of IPO and higher than 50% of the previous year's RPIC of IPO for the 2 year before the previous year of IPO. *D: (1) higher than 150% of the time deposit interest rate for 2 years prior to IPO or (2) higher than the 150% of the time deposit interest rate for the previous year of IPO and higher than the time deposit interest rate for the 2 year before the previous year of the IPO *E: higher than 150% of the time deposit interest rate for the previous year of IPO and aggregate 30% for the 3 year prior to IPO *average debt ratio of the industry comes from "Financial Statement Analysis" published annually by the Bank of Korea. 
